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anaging the Recovery in Uncertain Times 
was the topic of our third annual
Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum held on 
November 14, 2003.  This event, sponsored 
by the Bank’s Research Department, brought together a 
group of highly respected academics, policymakers, and 
market economists, for discussion and debate about the 
effect of uncertainty on economic decision-making.  Our 
hope is that the 2003 Policy Forum serves as a catalyst 
for both greater understanding and more research on 
policymaking in the face of uncertainty.
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director of




In its March 2003 press re-
lease, the FOMC acknowledged the 
difficulties that increased uncertainty 
was creating for assessing the risk to 
the economic outlook: “In light of the 
unusually large uncertainties cloud-
ing the geopolitical situation in the 
short run and their apparent effects on 
economic decision-making, the Com-
mittee does not believe it can usefully 
characterize the current balance of 
risks with respect to the prospects for 
its long-run goals of price stability and 
sustainable economic growth.”
Although policymakers and 
forecasters always have to operate in 
an uncertain environment, the de-
gree of uncertainty that surrounded 
the economy during this cycle stands 
out.  In fact, a search of the Wall Street 
Journal’s archives shows that the words 
“uncertainty” or “uncertainties” ap-
peared in that newspaper 20 percent 
more times in the three years 2001-
2003 than during a comparable period 
10 years ago, 1991-1993.  This might 
not be the best measure, but it is an 
indication that “uncertainty” was on 
people’s minds.
Those uncertainties began 
with the tragic attacks of September 
11.  The initial economic uncertainties 
surrounding that event — for example, 
whether the banking system would 
continue to operate and whether 
and when the markets would reopen 
— were resolved quickly.  But new 
uncertainties arose in 2002.  These 
included uncertainties surrounding the 
outcome of the war with Afghanistan, 
the possibility of continued terrorist 
threats, and the effects of the corpo-
rate accounting and governance scan-
dals that broke in the summer of 2002, 
all of which created concerns about 
the staying power of the recovery.  An-
other large uncertainty loomed at the 
beginning of 2003, namely, whether 
and when U.S. military action in Iraq 
would start.  The military campaign 
was followed by uncertainty about the 
success of rebuilding and peacekeeping 
activities in Iraq.  
On the economic front, ques-
tions about the efficacy of monetary 
policy in a low-inflation or stable-price 
environment added additional uncer-
tainty.  Layered on top of all this was 
the fact that the economy appeared to 
be undergoing some structural changes 
on its own.  There was uncertainty 
about whether the usual economic 
dynamics continued to be at work or 
whether these dynamics had shifted.  
Thus, the Policy Forum began with a 
discussion of some of the sectors — the 
consumer, housing, investment, and 
labor markets — that appeared to have 
behaved somewhat differently during 
the recovery that began in November 
2001.  We then turned to implications 
of uncertainty for optimal monetary 
policy and the effect on the economy 
of the uncertainty raised by the cor-
porate governance and accounting 
scandals. 
An underlying theme that 
emerged during the presentations was 
that uncertainty assumes many guises 
and each can have a different effect on 
the economy and decision-making.
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gan the day discussing how the three 
factors usually cited as causing the very 
slow turnaround in the labor market 
during this recovery — weak aggregate 
demand growth, strong productivity 
growth, and an increasing use of for-
eign labor — were all part of the same 
phenomenon, namely, the unfolding 
impact of the technological revolu-
tion on the economy.  The boom and 
subsequent bust of business spending 
on information and communications 
technology (ICT) had generated the 
most recent business cycle.  The very 
strong tech spending in the late 1990s 
represented a mix of both good and 
bad judgments. An implication is that 
it took the business sector three years, 
from 2000 through 2002, to digest this 
major investment spending, reallocat-
ing it across firms and fully exploiting 
its capabilities to boost productivity 
and cut costs within firms.  Only after 
this were firms ready to contemplate 
new investment. 
The late 1990s’ acceleration 
in ICT investment coincided with a 
marked pickup in productivity growth, 
which points to higher growth in po-
tential GDP.  To re-employ those who 
became unemployed or underemployed 
during the recession and early recov-
ery, real GDP growth would need to be 
higher than this now higher growth of 
potential. Moreover, the ICT revolu-
tion has raised the potential for pos-
sible mismatches in the near term 
between workers’ skills and businesses’ 
requirements, which can slow the rate 
at which unemployed workers are re-
employed, relative to previous recover-
ies. In the longer term, it also means 
that industries will need to restructure, 
similar to what we’ve experienced in 
previous technological revolutions. 
Santomero points out that while these 
transformations benefit society by 
leading to higher income growth over-
all, the transition can be very difficult 
for workers whose job requirements 
and locations change.  In his view, the 
flexibility of the U.S. economy implies 
that markets will induce the required 
adjustments, and these adjustments 
will occur in a global context.
 Santomero notes that the 
ICT revolution is creating an increas-
ingly integrated market for both goods 
and services, including labor services.  
Information can be disseminated, 
transactions effected, and far-flung 
activities coordinated at lower cost 
than ever before.  This means that as 
a result of the technology revolution, 
the demand for labor in the U.S. will 
become more sensitive to the labor 
market and other economic conditions 
abroad.  Still, while economic forces 
will play out in a broader global con-
text, the forces are not fundamentally 
different from those we’ve experienced 
in the past.  Thus, in Santomero’s view, 
economic stabilization policies, both 
monetary and fiscal, can still be effec-
tive in mitigating the impact of busi-
ness cycles in this globally integrated 
economy in which market forces have 
an increasingly international scope.  
The Policy Forum turned 
next to issues of how this business 
cycle has played out in various sectors 
and the role of uncertainty in the eco-
nomic dynamics.
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR1
I had the pleasure of moderat-
ing the first session, which addressed 
the behavior of the consumer sector.  
Typically in recessions, consumer 
spending declines, but during the 2001 
recession, consumer spending con-
tinued to grow.  As interest rates fell 
to historically low levels, there were 
several waves of mortgage refinancings, 
which put money into homeowners’ 
pockets. Increased home equity buoyed 
consumers’ wealth, even as the stock 
market booms of the 1990s ended and 
the market significantly corrected.  
How important were these factors to 
consumer spending during the cycle?  
How do consumers respond to increas-
es in their wealth?  The session’s papers 
underscored the importance of looking 
beyond the simple conventional wis-
dom in addressing these questions. 
Frank Stafford of the Uni-
versity of Michigan, and director of 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), began his presentation by 
discussing the role of housing equity 
in the economy and what he terms 
the “refi puzzle.”  Almost 40 percent 
of households’ nonpension wealth is in 
housing equity.  The cost of accessing 
home equity can be high. It’s not unex-
pected that when mortgage rates fall, 
possibly as the result of a change in 
monetary policy, one of the responses 
is a boom in refinancing.  What’s less 
expected is that there are people who 
refinance even during periods when 
interest rates are high. Moreover, 
there are people who refinance and 
pay a higher rate.  This suggests there 
may be different motivations for refi-
nancing.  Stafford’s research, which 
is co-authored by Erik Hurst of the 
University of Chicago and which uses 
micro data from the PSID, suggests 
that there are two motivations for 
refinancing.  The first is the standard 
theory of refinancing: Refinancing is a 
financial option that is exercised when 
it is “in the money” (i.e., when interest 
rates fall enough relative to the costs 
of refinancing to make it financially 
worthwhile). Stafford’s research indi-
cates that people who refinance for 
this reason are not, in general, spend-
ing the proceeds.  Instead, the money 
shows up elsewhere in their portfolio.
But there is a second mo-
tive for refinancing: a consumption 
option.  Income is variable but home 
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unlocked via refinancing. People who 
face an unexpected need for funds may 
refinance to gain access to their equity 
for spending. Thus, they may refinance 
and remove equity from their home 
even if they end up paying a higher 
rate (and Stafford finds that those 
whose refinancing results in a loan-to-
value ratio over 0.8 do pay a premium).   
Note that refinancing for this reason 
can occur even in a stable interest rate 
environment.  His empirical results 
indicate that rational households use 
home equity to buffer shocks to in-
come — refinancing allows households 
to optimally smooth their consumption 
in the face of income shocks — and 
liquidity-constrained households spend 
most of the proceeds from refinancing. 
The implication is that re-
financing provides monetary policy 
another channel through which to af-
fect the economy. Stafford’s empirical 
results suggest that the liquidity-con-
strained households that experienced 
unemployment (an income shock) 
converted 60 cents out of every dollar 
they removed from equity via refinanc-
ing into current consumption (and this 
is likely a lower bound); on average, 
they removed about $16,000.  He esti-
mates that there was $18 billion in new 
spending by these liquidity-constrained 
households generated by refinancings 
as the Fed cut interest rates in 1993-94.   
But Stafford also points out 
the downside. His data show that 
people who paid premium rates to 
refinance in the late 1990s often sub-
sequently got into financial distress 
and pulled back spending.  Thus, 
policymakers cannot expect to use the 
mortgage refinancing channel recur-
rently over short time periods.  None-
theless, Stafford hypothesizes that the 
2001 recession generated a substantial 
negative stock market wealth effect 
that was, to a substantial extent, coun-
teracted by the housing refinancing 
channel.
Sydney Ludvigson of New 
York University continued the discus-
sion of the marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth.  As the stock 
market surged in the late 1990s, house-
hold net worth grew 47 percent from 
1995 to 2000.  A growing concern was 
the potential negative effect a large 
stock market correction might have on 
consumer spending and the aggregate 
economy.  Another concern was that 
in the absence of a correction, con-
sumers would be reacting to the surge 
in the stock market with a lag, so that 
eventually there would be an accelera-
tion in consumption and an increase 
in inflationary pressures.  Ludvigson 
concludes that both risks were not 
significant, based on her research with 
Martin Lettau of New York University.  
This research addresses four common 
statements about consumption and 
wealth and shows that the conven-
tional wisdom is misleading.
Misleading statement (1):  
“An increase in the stock market raises 
consumption via the wealth effect.”  
This is misleading because it ignores 
the distinction between transitory and 
permanent increases in wealth and 
treats all wealth changes equally.  But 
only permanent changes in wealth af-
fect consumption. Consumers do not 
react to unsustained transitory chang-
es. That’s not to say that transitory 
changes can’t be long-lived.  Ludvigson 
estimates that a transitory wealth 
shock continues to affect asset values 
for a little over four years. 
Moreover, Ludgvison’s re-
search indicates that nearly all wealth 
fluctuations are transitory.  (The 
transitory and permanent changes 
in wealth, consumption, and income 
are identified using cointegration 
techniques, exploiting the fact that 
these three variables follow a common 
trend over the long term.  Deviations 
from this common trend are transi-
tory changes.)  She estimates that over 
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the postwar period, only 12 percent of 
the variation in household net worth 
(wealth) is attributable to permanent 
changes; the other 88 percent is transi-
tory and mainly driven by volatility of 
the stock market.
Misleading statement (2): 
“A good rule of thumb is that a $100 
dollar gain in wealth raises spending 
by about $4.”  This is true only if the 
change in wealth is permanent.  Most 
changes in wealth are associated with 
no change in consumption, since most 
changes in wealth are transitory. 
Conventional estimates 
put the marginal propensity to con-
sume out of wealth at 4 percent, but 
Ludvigson’s research suggests that this 
overstates the effect of an increase 
in wealth on consumption, since it 
ignores the distinction between per-
manent and transitory increases in 
wealth.  She estimates that a $100 
increase in wealth would typically 
imply only a 60 cent increase in con-
sumption, since most of the change in 
wealth is transitory. Since most of the 
gain in the stock market in the late 
1990s boom was a transitory change, 
it wasn’t going to have a large effect on 
consumption.  Hence, worries at the 
time about the effect of a stock market 
crash precipitating a rapid retraction of 
consumer spending and perhaps caus-
ing a recession had little foundation.
Consider the bull market 
from 1995 to 2000.  Households re-
acted to the increase in their wealth 
but took account of the possibility of a 
stock market correction.  The increase 
in consumption was $1.70 per $100 
increase in stock market wealth, not 
the $4 it would have been if consum-
ers thought the increased wealth were 
permanent.  Similarly, the stock mar-
ket retreat from 2000 to 2002 elicited 
a reduction in consumer spending, 
but only by about 10 cents per $100 of 
wealth lost.  According to Ludvigson, 
historically, the economy has not had 
a hard landing stemming from the ef-
fects of a stock market correction on 
consumption. 
Misleading statement (3):  
“Consumers ignore daily volatility but 
spend if the gains in wealth stay for a 
few quarters.”  No, consumers ignore 
transitory changes, even if they last for 
several years.
Misleading statement (4):  “It 
takes many quarters for permanent 
changes in wealth to affect spending.”  
This is not true for most of consumer 
spending, which responds to perma-
nent changes in wealth within about 
one quarter. Spending on durable 
goods takes about two quarters to 
respond, but durables make up only 
10 percent to 15 percent of consumer 
spending.  This means that in the late 
1990s, it was unlikely that there was 
some pent-up consumption due to the 
stock market boom that was waiting 
in the wings to put upward pressure on 
inflation.
The implication of Ludvig-
son’s findings is that policymakers 
need to carefully evaluate the type of 
wealth increase in order to forecast 
its effect on consumption. Failure to 
distinguish between permanent and 
transitory increases in wealth could 
lead to overstating the sensitivity of 
consumption to changes in wealth and, 
therefore, policy mistakes.
It is interesting to consider 
the relationship between the Stafford 
and Ludvigson results. In the audi-
ence discussion following the formal 
presentations, Ludvigson mentioned 
additional results that show that in 
contrast to aggregate wealth, the non-
stock-market component of wealth, 
which includes housing, has a very 
small transitory component; most of 
the changes are permanent. Thus, 
households would be more responsive 
to changes in wealth derived from 
housing than that derived from the 
stock market.  Stafford’s results sug-
gest that different households respond 
differently to changes in wealth; so it 
would be interesting to extend Ludvig-
son’s aggregate results using Stafford’s 
micro data allowing for heterogeneity 
across households. Perhaps different 
households respond differently to the 
permanent and transitory components 
of wealth.
A further question is, How do 
households infer whether the changes 
in wealth are permanent or transitory?  
Note that the different marginal pro-
pensities to consume out of permanent 
and transitory changes in wealth may 
reflect this inference problem. It could 
be that it takes time for consumers to 
identify whether a change is perma-
nent, so that the impact of changes in 
wealth on consumption is only gradual.   
And the more volatile the component 
of wealth, the more gradual its impact, 
since the inference problem is more 
difficult.  This might explain the high-
er marginal propensity to consume out 
of changes in non-stock market wealth, 
which is less volatile, and changes in 
stock market wealth, which is more 
volatile.
Another question arises: If 
consumers are really able to identify 
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the transitory and permanent com-
ponents, why aren’t they selling when 
stock market prices are over trend and 
buying when stock market prices are 
below trend, thereby eliminating the 
transitory fluctuations? One unsatis-
fying answer is investor irrationality.  
But models of rational investor be-
havior that allow for time-varying risk 
aversion on the part of investors (in 
particular, where risk aversion varies 
over the business cycle and is higher 
in bad economic times and lower in 
good economic times) can also help 
explain persistent transitory variation 
in the prices of risky assets.   House-
holds might be willing to buy risky 
assets at temporarily higher prices in 
good times, since they’ve become less 
risk averse, even if they expect lower 
prices in the future. And they might be 
unwilling to buy assets with temporar-
ily low prices in bad economic times, 
since they’ve become more risk averse.
   
THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY
The Policy Forum’s next ses-
sion looked at the behavior of two 
other sectors — labor markets and 
business investment — in an uncertain 
environment and concluded with a dis-
cussion of how to forecast when there 
is an increased level of uncertainty.  
The labor market has figured 
prominently in discussions of the re-
cent recession and recovery.  Indeed, 
employment growth had been the 
“missing link” of this recovery until re-
cently. Richard Rogerson of Arizona 
State University discussed the possible 
effect increased uncertainty might be 
having on the labor market, emphasiz-
ing that different types of uncertainty 
may have different effects.  He began 
by pointing out that from a policy per-
spective, it is important to determine 
what the underlying causes of observed 
changes in the labor market are, since 
they may require very different policy 
prescriptions.  But determining these 
causes is difficult because policymakers 
must analyze data in real time. Often, 
we economists first look at the data 
and then try to formulate a model that 
helps us understand the data.  The 
model generally describes the steady 
state, a very stable situation, and then 
adds some shocks that induce fluctua-
tions around that steady state. Then, 
when studying some particular eco-
nomic event ex post, the economist 
will try to assess whether it is best 
thought of as a fluctuation around the 
steady state or a change in the steady 
state. This helps direct the search 
for the driving forces of the event. If 
one looks at historical episodes, one 
can tell whether, say, employment 
growth temporarily declined and then 
returned to its previous steady state 
or whether it has stayed down, which 
would be interpreted as a change in 
the steady state. But Rogerson points 
out that economists and policymak-
ers have to look at the data in real 
time, so it won’t be clear at any point 
in time whether growth will revert to 
its previous rate or whether it will stay 
down. In a situation like this, Roger-
son says, additional information must 
be brought to bear.  For example, one 
could look at other indicators of the 
economy. A rebound in other variables 
but a continued decline in employment 
might indicate that there has been a 
permanent decline in employment, i.e., 
a change in the steady state.
The current recovery is an 
interesting case.  The economy contin-
ued to lose a significant number of jobs 
after the recession trough in November 
2001.  Indeed, the current data suggest 
that nonfarm payrolls fell by 1.4 mil-
lion jobs from November 2001 through 
August 2003, before companies began 
rehiring in September 2003.  In Rog-
erson’s view, that situation should lead 
one to consider whether some more 
fundamental, longer run changes are 
taking place in the economy. One pos-
sibility was that increased uncertainty 
was depressing the steady-state level 
of employment by discouraging job 
creation.
But as Rogerson points out, 
in thinking about the effect of uncer-
tainty on job creation, it is important 
to be more precise about what is meant 
by uncertainty. Hiring is a costly and 
risky endeavor.  Recruiting and train-
ing workers takes time and money.  
The payoff from hiring is uncertain, 
not only because the quality of the 
worker is uncertain but also because 
future demand for the firm’s product 
is uncertain.  Although this might 
seem to imply that increased uncer-
tainty would make firms less willing 
to hire, Rogerson points out that this 
need not be the case — it depends 
on what’s meant by increased uncer-
tainty.  If increased uncertainty means 
that the firm’s average return is the 
same but the distribution of possible 
returns is more dispersed (i.e., there’s 
a mean-preserving spread of returns), 
this would not be bad for job creation. 
That’s because for a firm, returns are 
truncated on the downside — if the 
return goes below a certain point, the 
firm will close — but they are not 
truncated on the upside — the firm 
gets to keep all of the upside gains.  
This type of increased uncertainty 
From a policy per-
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tant to determine what 
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would actually be good for job cre-
ation.
But in Rogerson’s view, this 
is probably not the type of increased 
uncertainty that affected the economy 
during the beginning of the recovery. 
Instead, firms thought there was a 
greater chance that something bad 
would happen that would cause them 
to lose their investment.  This is not 
a spreading out of possible returns, 
but a greater weight on bad outcomes. 
Rogerson investigated the implica-
tions of this type of uncertainty for job 
creation. He modeled increased un-
certainty as corresponding to a shorter 
expected lifetime for the job once it is 
created and assumed that job creation 
entails certain costs, including equip-
ment, recruiting, and training costs. 
His research implies that a permanent 
10 percent increase in uncertainty, 
i.e., a 10 percent shortening of the ex-
pected life of the job, would lead to a 
0.5 percent decrease in employment in 
the steady state — not a trivial effect, 
but not a large one either.
In Rogerson’s view an in-
crease in uncertainty is unlikely to 
be the main reason for labor market 
weakness during this recovery: It 
would take massive increases in un-
certainty of the type modeled to result 
in the employment declines seen early 
in the recovery. However, he does 
acknowledge that if the increase in 
uncertainty were perceived to be tem-
porary, it might have larger effects, as 
firms wouldn’t act until uncertainty 
was resolved.
In thinking about alternative 
explanations for labor market weak-
ness, Rogerson notes that although 
along some dimensions all business 
cycles are the same, along other di-
mensions, there is some heterogeneity 
across those cycles.  Current condi-
tions need not be suggesting there has 
been a fundamental change in the la-
bor market or business cycle.  Compar-
ing the current recovery to past recov-
eries, he shows there was considerable 
variation in how long it took the labor 
market to recover.  The early part of 
the 1991-92 recovery looked similar 
to the current cycle, but the market 
eventually recovered strongly, i.e., it 
did not remain at a permanently lower 
steady state. Rogerson points out that 
in the 1970-71 recession/recovery, it 
took almost a year from the trough for 
labor markets to begin showing some 
recovery.  Thus, other recoveries in the 
past have had somewhat of a “jobless 
recovery” aspect to them. 
He concludes that it is too 
soon to say that the labor market 
weakness that occurred in 1991-92 
and in the current recovery represents 
a change in the nature of businsess 
cycles. But if the business cycle has 
changed this time around, Rogerson 
suggests it could be changes in produc-
tion methods, workforce options, or 
composition of economic activity, or it 
might be a reflection of the nature of 
the shocks that caused the cycle.  He 
believes that to understand recoveries, 
one must also investigate the reces-
sions that preceded them.  That is, to 
come to any understanding about the 
changing nature of the business cycle, 
one must look at the whole cycle.
Andrew Abel of the Whar-
ton School, University of Pennsylva-
nia, turned our attention to business 
investment under uncertainty.  He be-
gan discussing two theories of invest-
ment: the standard Tobin’s q theory 
and the newer real options theory of 
investment.  Although many econo-
mists believe that the theories reach 
different conclusions regarding invest-
ment under uncertainty, Abel shows 
that when these theories are correctly 
applied, they yield similar answers. 
According to q theory, the 
rate of firm investment, i.e., the rate 
at which firms want to increase the 
capital stock, should be related to q, 
the market value of new additional 
capital relative to its replacement cost.  
Given that changing one’s capital 
stock involves adjustment costs, a firm 
will undertake investment until the 
marginal cost of investment is equal to 
the marginal value of another unit of 
capital, q.  This implies that the firm 
will invest up to the point where the 
net present value of the next unit of 
capital is equal to zero.  Since marginal 
q is not observable, average q, mea-
sured as the value of the firm divided 
by the replacement cost of its capital 
stock, is used.
According to the real options 
theory of investment, the decision to 
invest now is an irreversible decision; 
the firm has given up the option of 
waiting for more pertinent information 
on which to base its investment deci-
sion, and the elimination of this option 
is a cost of investing today.  
What are the implications 
of the theories for investment under 
uncertainty? Similar to the point 
made by Rogerson, it depends on the 
type of uncertainty and the type of 
investment. Consider the real options 
theory: If investment is irreversible 
(i.e., the capital has no value to others, 
so it cannot be sold), an increase in 
uncertainty should tend to discourage 
current investment, since it raises the 
value of this option, i.e., the cost of 
investing today.  But if investment is 
reversible, this need not be the case, 
since the firm can undo the invest-
ment decision.
The effect of increased un-
certainty on investment may depend 
on a number of other aspects of the 
economy, e.g., how competitive the 
economy is and whether firms use in-
creasing or decreasing returns to scale 
technologies.  For example, the litera-
ture suggests that under increasing re-
turns to scale and perfect competition, 
an increase in uncertainty, holding all 
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therefore induce higher investment 
(for reasons similar to those Rogerson 
discussed regarding a firm’s hiring de-
cision when the increased uncertainty 
is a mean-preserving-spread of future 
returns).  But under decreasing returns 
to scale or when firms have monopoly 
power and investment is costly to re-
verse, increased demand uncertainty 
can mean lower investment.  Fortu-
nately, q will give the correct signal: If 
higher uncertainty results in lower q, 
investment will decline, and vice versa.
Abel concluded his talk with 
an application of the q theory to the 
current business cycle, which was 
driven by the investment cycle: q rose 
significantly during the boom of the 
1990s and then tumbled, and invest-
ment followed it with a slight lag.  Abel 
was optimistic about future investment 
given the recent turnaround in q.
According to Laurence 
Meyer of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, and of Macro-
economic Advisers, uncertainty and 
forecasting go hand in hand.  These 
uncertainties include forecasting er-
rors; which model is correct and the 
parameters of that model; unknow-
able shocks that can hit the economy; 
identification of structural change 
(discussed by Rogerson); and data revi-
sions or lack of data on important fun-
damentals such as potential growth.  
What’s a forecaster to do with so much 
uncertainty?  Meyer suggests that the 
first rule is “be humble.” Next, identify 
what you know more about and what 
you know less about.  Finally, con-
tinually learn, since the economy is a 
dynamic place and economic research 
is advancing as well. One of the impor-
tant things a forecaster can do is know 
when an old story is over and when a 
new one is beginning.
Meyer outlined three major 
questions facing forecasters in the late 
1990s, when he served as a Federal 
Reserve Board Governor: Was there 
a productivity acceleration and what 
were its implications?  Was there a 
bubble in the stock market (irrational 
exuberance)? And would the U.S. ex-
perience a spillover effect from global 
financial turmoil?
It wasn’t obvious using the 
real-time data that we were in the 
midst of a productivity acceleration, 
but even after that determination, 
knowing its implications wasn’t trivial.  
In Meyer’s view one lesson we learned 
from the second half of the 1990s 
was that the productivity acceleration 
wasn’t just a major supply shock; it was 
a powerful demand shock as well, driv-
ing an investment and consumption 
boom.  It led to above-trend output 
growth and rapid employment growth.  
We also learned that the productivity 
acceleration was a powerful disinfla-
tionary event and that it could signifi-
cantly increase the equilibrium real 
interest rate, which has implications 
for monetary policy.  
These developments were not 
consistent with the simplest models in 
which productivity growth affects wag-
es and prices symmetrically.  In these 
models, there should be no relationship 
between NAIRU (the non-accelerat-
ing-inflation-rate of unemployment) 
and productivity growth.  In Meyer’s 
view the late 1990s showed that when 
there’s an unanticipated acceleration 
in productivity, there is a significant 
effect on short-run NAIRU and on 
inflation dynamics.  Thus, it was time 
to change the model — in particular, 
productivity growth may have asym-
metric effects on wages and prices, 
with prices responding more immedi-
ately to changes in productivity growth 
than do wages. In this case, prices fall 
in response to an unexpected rise in 
productivity, and NAIRU falls in the 
short run. Meyer believes that this is 
a big part of the reason the decline in 
unemployment didn’t lead to higher 
inflation in the second half of the 
1990s.  (Later in the day, Al Broaddus, 
the recently retired president of the 
Richmond Fed, also spoke about this 
acceleration in productivity growth.)
Another big question faced 
Meyer and his fellow policymakers 
and forecasters: Was the run-up in 
the stock market based on “irrational 
exuberance” and therefore unsustain-
able? If so, a stock market correction 
could be expected in the near future. 
In Meyer’s view economic perfor-
mance over the past few years can be 
explained as a post-bubble hangover, 
dominated by imbalances inherited 
from the bubble period, including the 
capital overhang and over-leveraged 
corporate balance sheets.  These im-
balances made it difficult to forecast 
during this period.  To the extent 
that these imbalances are corrected, 
it would be a mistake to weight them 
too heavily in forecasting the future.  
However, he points out that the fu-
ture always has some roots in the past 
— there are legacies that affect the 
economy going forward.
Today’s economy is also af-
fected by several uncertainties. One of 
the largest in Meyer’s view is whether 
In Meyer’s view one lesson we learned from 
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there’s been another acceleration in 
structural productivity growth. Under-
standing the source of the accelera-
tion would be important in assessing 
its impact on the economy, a theme 
echoed earlier in Rogerson’s presenta-
tion. Higher productivity growth has 
been associated with weaker labor 
markets this time, in contrast to the 
positive effect it had in the late 1990s. 
It could be that increased productivity 
growth derived from dif-
ferent sources may have 
a different impact on 
the economy.  The ac-
celeration in productivity 
growth in the late 1990s 
was driven by capital 
deepening, which went 
hand in hand with the 
investment boom and 
was beneficial for the 
labor market.  The post-
recession acceleration in 
productivity growth has 
been driven by competi-
tive pressures and cost 
cutting, which has been 
a negative factor for labor 
markets. 
Meyer con-
cluded by addressing 
how monetary policy-
makers should respond 
in times of heightened 
uncertainty. One school 




maker should attenuate 
his response. But another view is that 
the policymaker should be continu-
ally updating his model and reacting 
as aggressively as he normally would, 
based on the updated model.  In the 
late 1990s, these two schools would 
have produced observationally equiva-
lent outcomes: (1) if you are uncertain 
about the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, as the unemployment rate falls, 
you might not want to react to it, ver-
sus (2) as the unemployment rate falls 
without any acceleration in inflation, 
you revise down your estimate of the 
natural rate and therefore don’t need 
to respond.  Meyer says it is difficult to 
tell which of these was the dominant 
way of looking at policymaking in the 
second half of the 1990s.
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
Important advances in mac-
roeconomic theory and macroeco-
nomic modeling in recent years have 
given economists the necessary tools 
to address questions about optimal 
monetary policy. Robert King of Bos-
ton University gave a progress report 
on the development of macroeco-
nomic models with strong theoretical 
underpinnings that are being used to 
study optimal monetary policy.  These 
models are now sometimes referred 
to as the New Neoclassical Synthesis 
(NNS).  The new macro models incor-
porate rational expectations; neoclas-
sical foundations so that one can study 
consumption and investment dynam-
ics; and various mechanisms so that 
money can affect the real economy in 
the short run; they also can be used to 
evaluate alternative mon-
etary policy rules. These 
models are fully articulated, 
in the sense used by Tom 
Sargent (our next speaker), 
in that the objectives of 
firms and households, the 
structure of the markets 
in which they interact, the 
nature of the shocks that hit 
the economy, and the policy 
instruments and informa-
tion available to monetary 
policymakers are fully speci-
fied.  Thus, the models have 
strong micro foundations.
The models have 
yielded a strong and consis-
tent prescription for mon-
etary policy: The central 
bank should target a low 
and stable rate of inflation. 
Current research in optimal 
monetary policy design is 
looking at a variety of mo-
tivations for departing from 
this strict inflation target, 
including price shocks, ag-
gregate demand shocks, and 
financial market disruptions.   
But the general conclusion is that opti-
mally there would be little variation in 
the price level.
King reviewed the important 
ingredients in these models. Rational 
expectations modeling, developed by 
Tom Sargent and others, inevitably 
led to general equilibrium analysis 
and the development of important 
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computational and econometric tools. 
Economic agents often need to make 
forecasts about future events in order 
to make rational decisions, e.g., firms 
must forecast revenues and costs in or-
der to decide whether an investment is 
worth undertaking. Under rational ex-
pectations, firms and other economic 
agents adjust their expectations over 
time to minimize forecast errors — i.e., 
they are not consistently fooled.  Thus, 
outcomes won’t differ consistently 
from expectations over time.  To form 
its expectations, a firm must think 
about the product and labor markets in 
which it interacts, and this leads natu-
rally to the general equilibrium models 
known as real business cycle (RBC) 
models. RBC models emphasize the 
importance of shocks to the real side 
of the economy and, in particular, the 
role of technical progress as a source 
of fluctuations.  These models provide 
a powerful methodology for studying 
the interactions between the various 
agents in a macro economy.
King discussed the next ma-
jor development, the so-called New 
Keynesian macro model.  This model 
focuses on firms’ price-setting behav-
ior and produces a role for monetary 
policy in economic stabilization.  A 
key ingredient is the notion of price 
stickiness, i.e., firms have some market 
power and set prices, but they hold 
those nominal prices fixed for some 
period because adjusting prices is 
costly. This, in turn, gives the central 
bank an avenue for affecting real activ-
ity by affecting real markups and rela-
tive prices.  Note that a firm’s pricing 
decisions in the New Keynesian model 
depend on expected future inflation, 
and these pricing decisions determine 
current inflation.  Thus, current infla-
tion depends on expected inflation.
The New Neoclassical 
Synthesis (NNS) builds on the New 
Keynesian model by embedding the 
New Keynesian price stickiness and 
imperfect competition in a fully ar-
ticulated stochastic dynamic general 
equilibrium model with strong micro 
foundations.  A major benefit of these 
models is that they can be used to 
systematically study the effects of 
alternative monetary policy rules on 
real economic activity.  The NNS 
models indicate that monetary policy 
shocks can have large and persistent 
effects on real economic activity and 
that the choice of rule matters.  The 
models also underscore the impor-
tance of credibility in the monetary 
policymaker, since current inflation 
depends on expected future inflation.  
In King’s view the NNS underscores 
that the management of expectations 
may be a key part of the central bank’s 
job and that imperfect credibility in 
the monetary policymaker may be very 
important in understanding particular 
historical economic episodes.  
King concluded his presenta-
tion by discussing the implications of 
the NNS models for optimal monetary 
policy.  Within the context of the 
NNS model, a policy of strict inflation 
targeting at a zero inflation rate (i.e., a 
price level target) is optimal because it 
eliminates the relative price distortions 
caused by the interaction of inflation 
and sticky prices, since there is no in-
flation; it stabilizes the average markup 
and thereby holds fixed the market 
power distortion, which the central 
banks cannot eliminate; and it gener-
ates the same level of real output that 
would occur if prices were fully flexible 
and not sticky.  Note that this “natural 
rate of output” fluctuates with the real 
shocks that hit the economy.  King in-
dicates that estimates of the cost of in-
flation in these models are dependent 
on the details about price stickiness, 
which is assumed to be exogenous; he 
suggests this is one place where further 
research is necessary.  
More recent work with NNS 
models suggests that optimal monetary 
policy may deviate from strict adher-
ence to a price level target but that the 
models constructed to date indicate 
that optimal policy would allow only a 
little change in the price level.  King 
conjectures that simple targeting rules 
may be close to optimal for a wide class 
of models and that this remains an im-
portant subject of ongoing and future 
research.
Thomas Sargent of New 
York University continued the discus-
sion of optimal policy under uncer-
tainty.  The Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) comprises 19 
members.  As Sargent points out, it 
could be that they have different goals 
and objectives.  They might have dif-
ferent information on the economy 
— after all, the committee was de-
signed to have regional representation. 
Or they might have different models of 
the economy — i.e., they may put dif-
ferent probability distributions on the 
various possible sequences of  future 
economic outcomes. Sargent focused 
his discussion on this latter case.
As Sargent explained, rational 
expectations, which was discussed 
earlier by King, has been a power-
ful force in macroeconomics, and its 
power derives from the fact that it 
eliminates the possibility of different 
agents’ having different views of the 
world. Rational expectations doesn’t 
allow expectations to be free param-
eters; it makes them outcomes, and 
it delivers cross-equation restrictions 
that are important for deriving optimal 
policy. But as Sargent points out, ra-
tional expectations also eliminates any 
discussion of model mis-specification 
or multiple models.  Under standard 
rational expectations, all agents have 
the same model.  They can have dif-
ferent information, but they have the 
same economic model. In Sargent’s 
view, learning may be technically dif-
ficult to analyze, but in a world with 
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trivial — it’s just the application of 
Bayes’ Law to update beliefs.  
But experimental evidence 
suggests that agents do not act ac-
cording to Bayes’ Law applied to a 
single model.  Rational people behave 
as if they have multiple models, i.e., 
multiple probability distributions over 
various outcomes, in their heads. 
This is a very profound kind of model 
uncertainty, and it is not at all clear 
how learning should take place in such 
a world.  (For example, should you 
apply Bayes’ Law model by model?)  
In Sargent’s view this type of model 
uncertainty is an important factor in 
monetary policymaking.
With Tim Cogley, Sargent is 
currently researching models of learn-
ing with an application of why it took 
the Fed so long to stabilize the great 
inflation of the 1970s.  One story for 
Fed decision-making in this time pe-
riod is that economic research in 1960 
indicated there was an exploitable 
Phillips curve (i.e., a systematic trade-
off between inflation and unemploy-
ment), and in the mid-1960s, the Fed 
started trying to exploit it.  Inflation 
started rising. Economic research then 
suggested there is no exploitable Phil-
lips curve and that an optimal policy 
would target low inflation. The data in 
the early 1970s provided confirmation, 
and subsequently, the Fed returned to 
targeting low inflation.
This story is a learning story, 
with the Fed acting as a Bayesian deci-
sion-maker. But Sargent’s research sug-
gests that it is difficult to get this story 
to fit the facts. If the Fed was using 
the incoming data to update its beliefs 
about which was the correct economic 
model, by the early to mid-1970s, it 
would have put almost all the weight 
on the non-exploitable Phillips curve 
model as being the correct model.  A 
Bayesian decision-maker, then, would 
have begun targeting inflation in the 
early to mid-1970s. But the Fed de-
layed.  Sargent’s research suggests that 
the Fed may have been “model averag-
ing” instead. It’s true that in the early 
to mid-1970s, the evidence suggested 
that the non-exploitable Phillips curve 
model was almost certainly correct, but 
there was still a very small chance that 
the exploitable Phillips curve model 
was right. If it was, targeting inflation 
would have yielded extremely bad eco-
nomic outcomes.  Given that, inflation 
targeting was too risky.  The Fed be-
haved as a min-maxer — it chose the 
policy that yielded the best outcome 
under the worst-case scenario of as-
suming the wrong model was correct.  
It was only when the exploitable Phil-
lips curve model was proven incorrect 
that the Fed began to target inflation.
Sargent’s research on policy-
makers’ learning under model uncer-
tainty is relevant for today’s FOMC, 
and it is likely to remain relevant for 
the foreseeable future because, despite 
the advances outlined by King, model 
uncertainty will not be going away 
anytime soon.
Our next speaker, Al Broad-
dus, president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond (since retired), 
related firsthand knowledge of how an 
FOMC member learns and uses eco-
nomic research in formulating policy 
decisions.  Broaddus indicates that the 
economists in the Research Depart-
ment at the Richmond Fed, as well as 
academic visitors in the department, 
keep him abreast of ongoing research 
in monetary economics.  Some people 
believe that the FOMC sets its target 
rate for the federal funds rate mainly 
by looking at data on current eco-
nomic conditions and assessing what it 
indicates about the current state of the 
economy and the near-term outlook, 
then determining how promptly and 
strongly to respond to this informa-
tion, based on instinct and common 
sense.  Broaddus thinks this character-
ization is somewhat misleading, since 
it suggests a lesser role for economic 
analysis, including relatively recent 
developments in the academic litera-
ture.  In his view, economic analysis 
has frequently played a central role in 
determining policy, especially over the 
longer run. Indeed, Broaddus
thinks that one of the Fed’s great-
est achievements over the last three 
decades was its role in breaking the 
high inflation of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s and subsequently helping 
to bring the rate down to its current 
low level.  Broaddus indicates that eco-
nomic research showing there was no 
exploitable systemic tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment, discussed 
earlier by Sargent, paved the way for 
this accomplishment.
Broaddus next discussed 
three examples of how economic 
analysis guided his own thinking as 
a policymaker and how he has used 
economic principles in arguing his 
positions at FOMC meetings.  The first 
involved the inflation targeting debate 
at the January 31-February 1, 1995, 
FOMC meeting.2  Broaddus spoke in 
favor of inflation targeting, a posi-
tion he continues to hold today.  The 
underlying economic principle that in-
2 Transcripts of the meetings Broaddus discussed 
are available on the Board of Governors’ web 
site at www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/transcripts.
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formed his view was rooted in the idea 
of rational expectations, namely, that 
by announcing an explicit long-run 
inflation objective, the FOMC would 
enhance the credibility of its commit-
ment to low inflation. In a rational ex-
pectations world, this increased cred-
ibility would make it less likely that 
inflation would reaccelerate but, if it 
did, would make it less costly to bring 
inflation back down.
Broaddus points out another 
benefit of inflation targeting: it would 
allow the FOMC to act more aggres-
sively to help stabilize the economy in 
the short run, since its actions to do so 
would be less likely to reduce its cred-
ibility, thereby setting off an inflation 
scare.  Broaddus continues to believe 
that an inflation target would be ben-
eficial.  Indeed, the recent experience 
with disinflation and proximity to 
the zero bound on the fed funds rate 
underscores the need to avoid not only 
inflation that is too high but also infla-
tion that is too low. Broaddus stated 
that to him a 1 percent to 2 percent 
inflation target range for the core PCE 
would be acceptable.
Broaddus’s second example 
involves the Fed’s intervention in for-
eign exchange markets on behalf of 
the Treasury with the aim of affecting 
the value of the U.S. dollar. An ex-
tended discussion occurred during the 
November 15, 1994, FOMC meeting. 
Broaddus is opposed to such interven-
tion based on the underlying economic 
principle that intervention cannot 
have a sustained effect on the value of 
the dollar unless it is supported by ba-
sic monetary policy. He points out the 
problem that would arise if the policy 
needed to support the dollar conflicted 
with the appropriate policy based on 
domestic economic conditions.  At 
the very least, it might raise doubts 
about whether Fed policy will support 
domestic or external objectives.  In 
Broaddus’s view, the Fed’s intervening 
on behalf of the Treasury might put 
the Fed’s credibility as an independent 
monetary policymaker at risk unless 
the Fed “sterilized” this intervention, 
i.e., neutralized its effect on the fed 
funds rate by carrying out offsetting 
open market operations.  But if the 
Fed did so, the interventions would be 
unlikely to have a sustained impact on 
the value of the dollar.
Broaddus’s third example in-
volves the recognition that an increase 
in trend productivity growth has 
important implications for monetary 
policy. In 1996 and 1997, the FOMC 
began to recognize that the U.S. might 
be experiencing a sustained increase 
in trend productivity growth. Faster 
trend productivity growth would im-
ply slower growth in the cost of labor 
per unit of output for a while, since 
it would take time for real wages to 
catch up.  As firms passed the lower 
cost through to lower prices of their 
final goods and services, this would 
put downward pressure on inflation.  
Most reasoned that as long as rising 
productivity growth kept inflation low, 
the FOMC could refrain from raising 
its funds rate target.
At the May 20, 1997, FOMC 
meeting, Broaddus discussed another 
possible implication of higher trend 
productivity growth for monetary pol-
icy, namely, that the equilibrium real 
interest rate might be higher as a result 
of higher trend productivity growth.  
Broaddus explained his economic 
reasoning.  Higher trend productivity 
growth should cause firms to expect 
higher future earnings and workers to 
expect higher future wages in a world 
where the Fed has credibility for keep-
ing inflation stable and, therefore, 
expected inflation stable. If so, at the 
prevailing level of real interest rates, 
firms and workers would want to bring 
some of this expected future income 
forward and would do so by borrowing 
against it.  To prevent excessive cur-
rent demand, current real interest rates 
would need to rise. Broaddus reports 
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that his argument did not elicit a re-
sponse during the FOMC meeting. But 
in his view, somewhat more preemptive 
tightening might have prevented some 
of the excess investment during the 
late 1990s boom, which was followed 
by an investment decline and reces-
sion.
Broaddus advises policy-
makers that in addition to carefully 
monitoring incoming data, they must 
also use modern economic analytical 
tools to be successful. He believes his 
colleagues on the FOMC understand 
this and that economic analysis has 
improved policymaking over the past 
20 years.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Our last session focused on 
corporate governance, the system by 
which a corporation is managed and 
controlled.  The recent corporate ac-
counting and governance scandals 
have brought governance issues to the 
forefront.  Although the effect these 
scandals have had on real economic 
activity is difficult to measure, the 
scandals are often listed as one of the 
factors that put a damper on the early 
stages of the recovery.  Indeed, the 
FOMC’s August 13, 2002, press release 
read: “The softening in the growth of 
aggregate demand that emerged this 
spring has been prolonged in large 
measure by weakness in financial mar-
kets and heightened uncertainty relat-
ed to problems in corporate reporting 
and governance.” 
Andrew Metrick of the 
Wharton School, University of Penn-
sylvania, discussed some of his re-
search on the design of corporate gov-
ernance structures.  How much power 
should shareholders, the owners of 
firms, yield to managers?  Yielding too 
much power creates the potential for 
agency problems, since the managers’ 
and shareholders’ objectives may differ. 
Yielding too little means giving up the 
benefits of the managers’ expertise and 
resultant superior decision-making. In 
setting up the governance structure, 
shareholders want to be able to get rid 
of managers who aren’t doing their 
jobs, but they also want to give manag-
ers the power to make the decisions 
necessary to run the firm.
Before the wave of hostile 
takeovers in the 1980s, large firms 
were effectively immune from takeover.   
But as a result of the merger wave, in 
the mid-1980s, firms started adopting 
takeover defenses, such as poison pills 
and greenmail, and other provisions, 
to prevent takeover and reduce share-
holder rights.  Around the same time, 
many states passed laws to prevent 
outside firms from taking over firms in 
their states.  The takeover wave sub-
sided, but most of these provisions re-
mained with little change in the 1990s.
Using the variation in those 
provisions across firms, Metrick and 
his coauthors, Paul Gompers and Joy 
Ishii, developed a “governance index” 
to proxy for the level of shareholder 
rights at a large sample of firms.  The 
governance index is constructed using 
24 different provisions a firm might 
have in place that either decrease or 
increase shareholders’ rights (e.g., poi-
son pills, golden parachutes, severance 
contracts not contingent on a change 
in control of the firm, whether a super-
majority of shareholders is needed to 
approve a merger, etc.)  A higher level 
of the governance index means a high-
er level of managerial power relative 
to shareholder power.  The researchers 
studied how well firms with different 
levels of shareholder rights performed 
in the 1990s and found that firms with 
stronger shareholder rights accord-
ing to their index earned significantly 
higher returns than firms with weak 
shareholder rights.  Stronger share-
holder rights are also associated with 
higher profits, higher sales growth, 
lower capital expenditures, and fewer 
acquisitions made. Other researchers 
have found that firms with stronger 
shareholder rights generally have lower 
CEO pay and stronger pay-for-per-
formance and that firms with weaker 
shareholder rights tend to overinvest 
in booms and then have to cut more as 
the economy weakens.
Metrick points out that the 
governance index is a simple con-
struct and not a perfect measure of 
corporate governance and that the 
research cannot address causality (i.e., 
does good corporate governance lead 
to good performance? Or does good 
performance beget good corporate 
governance?).  Nonetheless, in his view 
the results suggest that governance 
does matter for firm performance and 
decision-making and may have large 
macroeconomic implications.  Metrick 
recommends empowering sharehold-
ers by dismantling takeover defenses, 
making it easier for shareholders to 
elect directors, and clearing the path 
for shareholder proposals that would be 
binding on a firm’s management.
Peter Hooper of Deutsche 
Bank Securities, Inc., continued the 
discussion by pointing out that up to 
this point, legislation and regulation 
have driven improvements in corpo-
rate governance, but in his view, inves-
tor preference will increasingly drive 
future improvements. As research by 
Metrick, Deutsche Bank, and others 
show, investors have good reason to 
take corporate governance seriously.  
However, governance, which has 
both structural elements (such as the 
composition and independence of the 
board of directors) and behavioral ele-
ments (such as the effectiveness and 
capability of the directors), has been 
slow to gain the attention of analysts 
and investors.  One reason is that U.S. 
firms are generally perceived to be well 
run and well regulated and that the 
scandals involve a few bad apples. An-
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get good data on governance.  This is 
beginning to change.  Information on 
governance is becoming more widely 
available, and a number of research 
firms have begun to rate firms on their 
corporate governance. In Hooper’s 
view this should result in institutional 
investors’ taking corporate governance 
issues more into account.  
Deutsche Bank Securities 
has produced its own rating system for 
firms’ corporate governance, combin-
ing quantitative and qualitative factors 
in four areas: board structure, indepen-
dence, and performance; shareholder 
treatment (e.g., the presence of anti-
takeover devices); information disclo-
sure; and corporate compensation. The 
resulting corporate governance scores 
vary widely across the firms in the 
S&P500. In Hooper’s judgment, the 
dispersion means that investors can-
not take for granted that being a U.S. 
firm or being in the S&P500 means 
that corporate governance standards 
are completely sound; the average firm 
has room to improve its corporate gov-
ernance performance on this metric. 
In fact, on average, governance scores 
have been improving: From June 2001 
to June 2003, 71 percent of the compa-
nies in the S&P500 showed improved 
scores. That’s not surprising given the 
increased regulatory and media inter-
est in governance over this period. 
More surprising to Hooper is that 
scores at 27 firms fell significantly over 
this period.  The key factors leading 
to the deterioration were the adoption 
of poison pills and/or equity incentive 
plans that would lead to dilution in 
shareholder voting power.  
There appears to be a weak 
positive correlation between corpo-
rate governance score and firm size 
as measured by market capitalization, 
but as Hooper points out, the causa-
tion could go either way.  Larger firms 
could be instituting better governance 
structures, perhaps because of greater 
investor scrutiny or because more re-
sources can be devoted to governance 
or better governance structures could 
lead to larger size over time. The 
governance score does not seem to be 
systematically related to which U.S. 
state a firm is incorporated in, but 
firms incorporated offshore in Pana-
ma, the Cayman Islands, or Bermuda 
have noticeably lower scores.  The 
Deutsche Bank research indicates 
that good corporate governance is
associated with a higher return on
equity in 10 out of the 16 major 
industry sectors of the S&P500, con-
sistent with Metrick’s results.  While 
corporate governance does not ex-
plain much of the overall volatility 
in stock prices across S&P500 firms, 
better governance does appear to be 
associated with a somewhat lower 
variance in a firm’s stock price.
Hooper’s conclusion is that 
investors and analysts have lagged 
in appreciating the importance of 
corporate governance to firm valu-
ation, partly because of the lack of 
information and data on governance.  
The scandals of the last two years 
have raised awareness of the issue, and 
data are becoming increasingly avail-
able with which to rate firms on their 
corporate governance performance.  
Hooper believes, as a result, investors 
will increasingly be taking corporate 
governance into account when mak-
ing their investment decisions.  
SUMMARY
The 2003 Policy Forum 
generated lively discussion among the 
program speakers and audience par-
ticipants on a number of issues that 
policymakers must confront in setting 
policy in uncertain times, which may 
be an apt description of our economy 
in the recent business cycle.  Our 
hope is that the ideas raised will spur 
further research and foster a greater 
understanding of today’s economy.
We will hold our fourth an-
nual Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum, 
“Challenges and Opportunities in the 
Global Economy: Perspectives on Out-
sourcing, Exchange Rates, and Free 
Trade,” on Friday, December 3, 2004. 
You will find the agenda on page 43.
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